The popular Calvo model with indexation (Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005) ) and sticky information (Mankiw and Reis (2002) ) models have guided much of the monetary policy discussion. The strength of these approaches is that they can explain the persistence of in ‡ation. However, both of these theories are inconsistent with the micro data on prices. In this paper, I evaluate the consequences of implementing policies that are optimal from the perspective of models that overlook the micro-data. To do so, I employ two models: the model proposed by Gali and Gertler (1999) and the Generalized Taylor Economy (GT E). These models can explain the persistence of in ‡ation and are consistent with the micro-data. The …ndings reported in the paper suggest that policy conclusions are signi…cantly a¤ected by whether persistence arises in a manner consistent with the micro-data and illustrate the potential for conclusions from the models that ignore the micro-data to be misleading.
Introduction
The Calvo model with indexation (i.e. the IC model) (Christiano et al. (2005) , Smets and Wouters (2003) ) has been a popular approach to monetary policy analysis 1 . According to this model, …rms set their prices in nominal terms for a random duration, as in the Calvo model, but throughout the contract length the nominal price is updated according to recent in ‡ation (i.e. indexation). The model was developed to better represent in ‡ation dynamics. As is well known (see Woodfrod (2003) , the Calvo model has been inadequate in this respect. In the IC model in ‡ation depends on expected in ‡ation, past in ‡ation and the output gap.
There is, however, a familiar warning that something is wrong with the Calvo with indexation model. The idea that prices are indexed to an in‡ation index now appears to be a myth. That is, the notion of indexation implies that all …rms in the economy continuously adjust their prices but this contradicts micro-evidence on prices 2 . The micro-evidence provided by the European Central Bank's In ‡ation Persistence Network for the Euro Area indicates that prices remain unchanged for several months 3 . Findings reported in Bils and Klenow (2004) and Nakamura and Steinsson (2007a) indicate the same conclusion for the US economy.
Therefore, while the assumption of indexation greatly improves the empirical performance of the Calvo model, there is a de…nite error that is induced as a result of this assumption. Thus, this approach to monetary policy analysis is problematic and any policy recommendations that arises from this model are questionable at best.
The problem under discussion here is not just a matter of theoretical signi…cance but is also a matter of practical importance. Models developed at the European Central Bank (ECB) provide an excellent demonstration of its importance. These models include the New Area Wide Model (NAWW) (Christo¤el, Coenen and Warne (2008) ) and the model developed by Christiano, Motto and Rostagno (2008) (CMR) . Smets (2008) notes that these models are "routinely" used at the ECB for monetary policy analysis. CMR assume full indexation 4 . The NAWW model estimates that the degree of indexation in the Euro Area is lower than that in the CMR model and is around 40%. However, the reduced degree of indexation comes at a cost: in the NAWW model, the degree of nominal rigidity is much higher than what the micro-evidence on prices suggests. Speci…cally, according to this model, the proportion of …rms that reset their contracts in a quarter is around 8%, whereas the micro-evidence provided by Dhyne et al. (2005) for the Euro Area indicates that this number is around 25%. It is not just that all prices change in each period, but also that the degree of nominal rigidity of the NAWW model is higher than suggested by the micro-evidence. Thus, from the perspective of the micro-data, the practical advice of economists at the ECB is based on models that are faulty.
Might it be the case that these models are "routinely" used for monetary analysis at the ECB because modellers at the ECB think that the assumption of indexation does not a¤ect the policy conclusions that arise from the model? If this is true, then this calls for an examination of whether policy conclusions are a¤ected by whether in ‡ation persistence in a manner consistent with the micro-data. This paper aims to examine the consequences of using a model for monetary policy analysis that overlooks the micro-evidence on prices. This requires a model that is as successful as the Calvo with indexation in generating in ‡ation persistence and, at the same time, is consistent with the micro-evidence on prices.
The …rst model that comes to mind is the sticky information (SI) model developed by Mankiw and Reis (2002) , which is commonly viewed as a promising tool to replace the Calvo with indexation. In this model, there is an uncertain contract length, as in the Calvo model, and …rm set prices for each period at the beginning of the contract, as in Fischer (1977) . Therefore, prices are conditional on the information …rms have when they set prices, so as the contract grows older information becomes increasingly out of date. The question then, is whether the sticky information model is any better assumed that prices are indexed to an "indexation" index, which is a weighted average of past in ‡ation and the central bank's time varying in ‡ation objective. Speci…cally, in this model, the central bank changes its target every period and …rms adjust their prices every period according to the central bank's objective. Their …ndings indicate that the weight on past in ‡ation in such an index is around 10%. Given that number, they conclude that the degree of indexation in their model is low. This conclusion, however, is incorrect, as it ignores the e¤ect of the time varying in ‡ation objective assumption on prices. Regardless of the degree of indexation to past in ‡ation, the prices remain fully indexed in the CMR model since the authors replace like with like.
than the Calvo with indexation, and; the answer is that it is not. It is not just the Calvo with indexation that is ‡awed; the SI model itself can be misleading for the same reasons. In fact, as Dixon and Kara (2010b) show, the model is similar to the Calvo with indexation in that, like thealtter, it can generate in ‡ation persistence and prices change every period. Therefore, the model generates in ‡ation persistence at the cost of having prices change every period and, therefore, is inconsistent with the micro-data.
However, there are two alternatives to these models, namely, the model by Gali and Gertler (1999) (GG) and the Generalized Taylor Economy (GT E) (Dixon and Kara (2010a) , Dixon and Kara (2010b) , Kara (2010)) 5 . These models can explain in ‡ation persistence in a way that is consistent with the micro-data on prices. The GG model assumes that a proportion of …rms set their prices according to a "rule-of-thumb". The remainder set their prices according to the Calvo process. The in ‡ation equation in this model is in the same form as in the in ‡ation equation in the IC model. In the GG; the coe¢ cients on past and expected in ‡ation rates on the share of the rule-of thumb price-setters, whereas in the IC, the coe¢ cients depend on the degree of indexation to the past in ‡ation.
The GT E generalizes the simple Taylor model to allow for sectoral heterogeneity with contract lengths suggested by the micro-data. Dixon and Kara (2010b) show that the GT E with an empirically relevant distribution of contract lenghts can potentially explain in ‡ation persistence. Figure 1 plots the distribution of contracts lengths for the US economy based on Bils and Klenow (2004) (see Dixon and Kara (2010b) for a detailed discussion). There is a very long tail, indicating some very long contracts: over 3% of weighted categories have less than 5% of prices changing per month, implying average contract lengths of over 40 months. The European data and the Nakamura and Steinsson (2008) …ndings are very similar in broad outline. Several paper have appeared recently which emphasise the importance of 5 This is not to ignore the recent model proposed by Cogley and Sbordone (2008) . These authors also note that the IC model is inconsistent with the micro-evidence on prices. They see in ‡ation persistence in terms of varying in ‡ation targets that cause trend in ‡ation to change. The GG and the GT E di¤er from theirs in that these models seek to explain in ‡ation persistence as an intrinsic consequence of the dynamic pricing process and not as a result of changes in monetary policy. This paper focuses on models that explain in ‡ation persistence as an intrinsic consequence of the dynamic pricing process. See also the model by Dennis (2006) . 6 . An important example is the paper by Coenen, Christo¤el and Levin (2007) which considers a multi-sector models with Taylor-style contracts. These studies show the emprical promise of such a model. However, it is important to note that there is a limitation to studies like this, as these studies consider models that have contract lengths of up to 4 periods. Clearly, as Figure 1 suggests, generating a more realistic case requires to go beyond the cases these papers consider 7 . A unique feature of the GT E framework is that it is su¢ ciently general that it can be used to model any distribution of contract lengths, including the one generated by the Calvo model (see Dixon and Kara (2010a) ). Indeed, recent work by Kara (2010) shows, that by using the GT E, that a failure to use a model that has a distribution that accounts for hetereogenity in the contract lengths that we observe in the data, signi…cantly a¤ect policy conclusions.
In this paper, I use the GT E and the GG models to investigate the consequences of implementing a policy that is optimal from the perspective of the IC or SI models. I …rst discuss how policy conclusions are a¤ected by whether inertia arises in a manner consistent with the micro-evidence. I then evaluate the welfare costs of ignoring the micro-data. To do so, I
consider the case in which the central bank employs a policy that is optimal from the perspective of a model that is inconsistent with the micro-data if the true economy is assumed to follow either the GT E or the GG.
The conclusions of this paper are brie ‡y summarised as follows: …rst, the results reported in the paper illustrate the potential for conclusions based on the IC and SI models to be misleading. This is because policy conclusions that arise from these models are signi…cantly a¤ected by the aspects of the models that are inconsistent with the micro-data. Second, the GT E and the GG have very similar policy recommendations and policy rules that are optimal from the perspective of the IC and SI models can lead to welfare losses. Calculations reported in the paper suggest welfare losses of around 0:01% 0:02% of consumption.
Section 2 outlines a macroeconomic framework that allows for the exploration of policy implications of the di¤erent models within a common environment. Section 3 derives a utility-based objective function for the central bank. Section 4 describes the calibration of the parameters. Section 5 presents the results. Section 6 reviews the related studies in the literature. Section 7 concludes the paper.
The Model
The framework presented here is based on Dixon and Kara (2010b) . There, a framework was developed that encompasses all of the main price-setting frameworks. The approach of the model is to consider an economy consisting of many sectors di¤erentiated by how long a contract lasts. When each sector has a Taylor-style contract we have a Generalized Taylor Economy (GT E). When each sector has a Fischer-style contract, we have a Generalized Fischer Economy (GF E). The Mankiw-Reis sticky-information (SI) model is a special case of the GF E: I also allow for indexation.
The exposition here aims to outline the basic building blocks of the model. I will …rst describe the structure of the contracts in the economy, then the price-setting process under di¤erent models and …nally monetary policy.
Structure of the Economy
In this model, as in a standard DSGE model, there are three types of agents: households, the government and …rms. Households and the government are both standard new Keynesian. There is a continuum of identical and in…nitely lived households (h 2 [0; 1]). The households derive utility from consumption and leisure. The government conducts monetary policy and levies a proportional tax t on all goods. t follows an AR(1) process 8 : Corresponding to the continuum of households h there is a unit interval of …rms, f 2 [0; 1]. Each …rm f is twinned with household h (f = h) 9 . A typical …rm is standard new-Keynesian. It has a monopoly power over a speci…c product, for which the demand has a constant price elasticity . It operates a technology,
subject to productivity shocks (Z t ). These products are then combined to produce the …nal consumption good Y t : The production function or aggregator is Dixit-Stiglitz.
Our assumption on the structure of contracts is novel. We divide the unit interval into segments corresponding to sectors and cohorts within sectors. There are N sectors 10 , i = 1:::N , with sector shares i summing to unity P N i=1 i = 1 . Contracts in sector i last for i periods. Within each sector i; there are i equally sized cohorts of unions and …rms: in each period, one cohort comes to the end of its contract and starts a new one. A standard Taylor model is represented by an economy in which one sector (usually with i = 2 or 4) has a share of unity, the rest has zero. In the GT E, in each sector i there is a Taylor contract; in the GF E, a Fischer-style contract. The SI model is a special case of the GF E.
In the GT E framework, while the unit interval are divided into segments corresponding to sectors and cohorts within sectors, this need not re ‡ect any objective factor in terms of sector or cohort speci…c aspects of technology or preferences. Sectors are composed of …rms that have the same contract length. In this sense, there is no sense of location. This is an important property, that allows it to be demonstrated that a Calvo economy can be represented by a GTE (see Dixon and Kara(2010a) for a full discussion). The Calvo model is di¤erent from the GT E because price setters do not know how long the contract will last: in each period a fraction ! of …rms chosen randomly start a new contract. However, the Calvo process can be described in deterministic terms at the aggregate level because …rm-level randomness washes out. As shown in Dixon and Kara (2006) , the distribution of contract lengths across …rms is given by i = ! 2 i(1 !) i 1 : i = 1:::1, with mean contract length T = 2! 1 1: The Calvo model with indexation has the same structure in terms of contract lengths, but there is indexation throughout the contract life in response to past in ‡ation. I will also describe the Gali and Gertler model and how it is related to the IC model.
The model here di¤ers from the one in Dixon and Kara (2010b) in that in Dixon and Kara (2010b) we assume that wages are sticky while goods prices are ‡exible, whereas here I assume that wages are ‡exible while goods prices are sticky. This di¤erence does not a¤ect the equilibrium conditions. This is simply beacuse of the assumption that each household h is twinned with …rm f . Thus, in Dixon and Kara (2010b) , a …rm and a household can be thought of as the same entity. Herein, I assume that wages are ‡exible while goods prices are sticky since the other models are de…ned in terms of price-setting. Note that Huang and Liu (2002) claim that price setting cannot generate as much persistence as wage setting. Edge disagrees with this conclusion. Edge (2002) shows that price setting can generate as much persistence as the wage setting, if one assumes a …rm-speci…c labour market, rather than a common labour market, as Huang and Liu do (see Woodford (2003, Chapeter 3 ) for a detailed dicussion). The result reported in this paper suggest that Edge's conclusion carries over to a setting in which there are many sectors, each with a di¤erent contract length.
Log-linearized Economy
In this section I will simply present the log-linearized macroeconomic framework 11 . The sectoral output level y it can be expressed as a function of the sectoral price p it relative to the aggregate price level p t and aggregate output y t ; where the coe¢ cient is the elasticity of demand (this is the loglinearisation of a CES production function relating intermediate outputs to aggregate output):
Sectoral price levels are given by the average price set in the sector, and the price is averaged over the i cohorts in sector i:
The log-linearised aggregate price index in the economy is the average of all sectoral prices:
The in ‡ation rate is given by t = p t p t 1 . The Euler condition (24) from the representative household's consumption is given byỹ
whereỹ t = y t y N t is the gap between actual output, y t and the natural level of output, y N t . r t is the nominal interest rate. rr
y N t denotes the real interest rate when prices are ‡exible. and the tax rate( t ) is at its average level ( ) : r N t , N f t and y N t denote the nominal interest rate, the in ‡ation rate and the output level when prices are ‡exible and the tax rate ( t ) is at its average level ( ), respectively.
The natural level of output (i.e., the level of output when prices are ‡exible and the tax rate ( t ) is at its average level ( )) is given by (derived in the Appendix).
where z t = log Z t is a productivity shock. Finally, the productivity shocks (z t = log Z t ) follow an AR(1) process. In particular,
where " zt is an idd(0;
Price-Setting Rules
Before de…ning the optimal price setting rules under di¤erent models, let us de…ne the optimal price that would occur if prices were perfectly ‡exible ("the optimal ‡exible price"). The log-linearised version of the optimal ‡exible price in each sector 12 is given by
with the coe¢ cient on output being:
is the parameter governing risk aversion
is the inverse of the labour elasticity, is the sectoral elasticity and the tax shocks (~ t = log(1 t ) follow an AR(1) process:~ t = ~ t 1 + " t : We can represent the alternative price-setting behaviour in terms of two general equations: one for the reset price in sector i (x it ) and one for the average price in sector i (p it ). For the GT E, these are 13 :
where ij = 1 i and 0 < a 1 measures the degree of indexation to the past in ‡ation rate. Without indexation (a = 0), the reset price (9) in sector i is simply the average (expected) optimal price over the contract length (the nominal price is constant over the contract length). Note that the reset prices will, in general, di¤er across sectors, since they take the average over a di¤erent time horizon. With indexation, the initial price at the start of the contract is adjusted to take into account future indexation over the lifetime of the contract. The average price in sector i (10) is related to the past reset prices and how far they have been indexed.
The two equations (9 and 10) can also represent the simple Calvo economy. To obtain the simple Calvo economy from (9), all reset prices at time t are the same (x it = x t ), the summation is made with i = 1 and ij = !(1 !) j 1 : j = 1:::1. and there is no indexation a = 0. Assuming 0 < a 1 extends the model to the case in which the prices are indexed to past in ‡ation. The standard equation for the average price is obtained by setting x it = x t , and setting the summation as i = 1 in (10).
As is well known (see Wood¤ord (2003, p. 213-218) , under these assumptions, the in ‡ation dynamics in the IC model can be expressed as:
where
and y = 1 1+a
In the GG model, as Steinsson (2003) shows, the in ‡ation equation is in the same form as in (11) ; expect that the coe¢ cients are di¤erent. In deriving this equation, Gali and Gertler assume that a fraction of …rms set their prices according to a "rule-of-thumb". The rest of the …rms set their prices according to the Calvo process 14 . More speci…cally, the price set by the rule-of-thumb …rms at time t are the price level a Calvo price-setter sets in t 1 plus an adjustment for in ‡ation, which is based on lagged in ‡ation. In the GG model, the coe¢ cients are as follows:
In a GF E, the trajectory of prices is set at the outset of the contract.
Suppose an i period contract starts at time t; then the sequence of prices chosen from t to t + i 1 is E t p t+s s=i 1 s=0
. Hence, the average price in sector i at time t is
which is the average of the best guesses of each cohort for the optimal ‡exible price to be holding at t and embodies the "sticky information" idea in Fischer contracts: part of current prices are based on old information. In the GF E, since cohorts are of equal size within sector i, ij = 1 i
. The Mankiw-Reis sticky-information (SI) model has ij = ! (1 !) j 1 : j = 1::1:
Monetary Policy Rules
I assume that the central bank follows a simple Taylor-type rule under which the interest rate reacts to the lagged interest rate, in ‡ation and the output gap.
The -coe¢ cients in front of the targeting variables are chosen to minimise welfare loss.
To provide a measure of the relative performance of this policy rule in a given model, I also report its relative loss, which gives the ratio between the loss under the rule and the …rst best welfare level obtainable in that model. The welfare level under the …rst best can be obtained by using Lagrangian methods. More speci…cally, this is the welfare level that can be obtained by maximising the welfare function subject to the equilibrium conditions. I obtain the …rst order conditions of this problem by di¤erentiating the Lagrangian with respect to each of the endogenous variables and setting these conditions to zero. I then combine the …rst order conditions together with equilibrium conditions and calculate the implied welfare level 15 .
Welfare Functions: Woodford' s Approximation
In this section, a utility-based objection function is derived to provide a benchmark for evaluating the performance of alternative monetary policy rules. We can represent the welfare function for each model in terms of a general equation. For the GT E, the welfare function is given by (derived in Appendix B)
where C is the steady state consumption, U c (C) is the marginal utility of consumption and t:i:p collects all the terms that are independent of policy. The loss function, L t , is given by
. This expression implies that welfare loss depends on the variance of the output gap and on the cross-sectional price dispersion. When there is only one type of contract length in the economy, the function reduces to the welfare function in a standard one sector Taylor model.
The loss function reduces to the loss function in the Calvo model as in Woodford (2003, p. 396) , when all reset prices at time t are the same (p ijt = p jt ), the summation is made with i = 1 and ij = !(1 !) j 1 : j = 1:::1 and there is no indexation. Woodford (2003) shows in the Calvo model and in its variant with indexation that, the welfare costs of cross-sectional price dispersion can be summarised in terms of variability of current and lagged in ‡ation rates 16 . Thus, the loss function can be rewritten as
16 In the GT E; this is not the case: the welfare costs of cross-sectional dispersion cannot be summarised in terms of variability of in ‡ation and must be given explicitly in terms of variances of relative prices. This is mainly because in the GT E; there is a distribution of sector-speci…c reset prices in each period.
In the case of the Gali and Gerler model, as Steinsson (2003) shows, the loss function is given by
where 1 r = ! 2 (1 ) . The loss function in this model penalize ‡uctua-tions not only in the output gap and in in ‡ation, as in the Calvo model but also in ( t t 1 ) : Thus, the degree of price dispersion in the GG model is higher than that in the Calvo model owing to the presence of backwardlooking rule-of-thumb price-setters in the GG. Increased degree of price dispersion in the GG means that price stability in this model is more important than that in the Calvo model.
The loss function gives the loss function in the sticky information model, as in Ball, Mankiw and Reis (2005) (p. 13), when ij = ! (1 !) j 1 : j = 1::1, p ijt = p jt ;and p jt = E t j+1 p t p t , When there is only one type of contract length in the economy ij = 1 i , the function reduces to the welfare function in a standard Fischer model. Ball et al. (2005) show that the crosssectional price variability in the SI can be expressed in terms of aggregate variables
4 The Choice of Parameters I begin with a calibration in a GT E. I consider a special GT E : Calvo-GT E, in which the share of each duration across …rms ( i = ! 2 i(1 !) i 1 : i = 1:::1) is the same as generated by the Calvo model 17 . The discussions in Bils and 17 The Calvo-GTE is one of the two GT Es which Dixon and Kara (2010b) consider. The Calvo-GT E is a special GT E because it has exactly the same contract structures, as in the standard Calvo model. However, the model captures in ‡ation dynamics better than the Calvo model. As discussed in detail in Dixon and Kara (2010b) , the Calvo-GT E is able to generate a hump-shaped in ‡ation response, whereas the Calvo-model cannot. The two models di¤er in their pricing rules. In the GT E, …rms know which sector they belong to and therefore they do not need to look beyond the contract duration when setting their Klenow (2004) and Nakamura and Steinsson (2007a) suggest that the Calvo distribution is not a bad approximation of empirical distribution. The two key parameters in this model are ! and . ! is the parameter that indicates the degree of nominal rigidity in the economy. prices. In the Calvo model, …rms do not know which sector they sector they belong to. Thus, when setting their prices, they have a probability distribution over the contract lengths. This makes the price setting behaviour myopic in the GTE. This myopia goes a long way towards explaining the output and in ‡ation dynamics we observe in the empirical data.
18 Note that this number excludes sales and substitution-related prices changes. The Bils and Klenow (2004) dataset indicate a lower degree of nominal rigidity: ! = 0:4 ( see Dixon and Kara (2010b) ): This is because Bils and Klenow (2004) include prices changes due to sales and substitutions. In any case, calibrating the Calvo-GT E by using ! = 0:4 does not a¤ect the conclusions signi…cantly.
19 Note that recent work by Levin, Onatski, Williams and Williams (2005) almost argues that the Calvo model without indexation matches the US data well. Speci…cally, it is argued that the degree of indexation in the US is as low as 13%. The Levin et al. (2005) conclusion is surprising because Levin et al. (2005) use a model that is very similar, if not identical, to that in Del-Negro, Schorheide, Smets and Wouters (2007) . Unfortunately, there is no hint to be found in Levin et al. (2005) as to why the degree of indexation is substantially lower in their model. Searching for the reason would lead me beyond the scope of purpose of this paper. Therefore, here I take the Del-Negro et al. (2007) view, which re ‡ects the common view. Recent work by Smets and Wouters (2007) replace the Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator with a more complicated aggregator (i.e. a Kimball aggregator (Kimball (1995) )) and …nd that doing so reduces the degree of indexation. The degree of indexation in this model is 0.24. However, such an assumption has signi…cant implications for optimal policy design. I leave this issue for a separate paper and here stick to the standard Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator. To calibrate the SI model, I choose among the values estimated by Coibion (2008) and Mankiw and Reis (2007) . The key parameters in this model are ! and . Coibion (2008) argues that low values of ! and are necessary for the model to match the persistence in the data. More speci…cally, he …nds that the model comes closer to matching the data when = 0:03 and ! = 0:7 (see Coibion(2008, p. 28, Figure 3) ). Findings reported in Mankiw and Reis(2007, p. 610 , Table 1 ) and in Kiley (2006, p.112 , Table  3 ) indicate the same conclusion. Coibion reports that the model's empirical performance deteriorates signi…cantly with a lower value of ! and a higher value of : Mankiw and Reis estimate that = 34:1 and ! = 0:7 20 . The value of = 34:1; along with cc = 1 and LL = 1:2;implies that = 0:05. Thus, I follow Mankiw and Reis (2007) and set = 34:1 and ! = 0:7 21 :There is no indexation. This calibration is also similar to the calibration in Reis (2008) , which studies the optimal monetary policy implication of the SI model. However, I will also report results with a lower value of ! and a 20 These values are based on maximum-likelihood estimates. The authors also estimate their model using Bayesian methods. In this case, the values are slightly lower: = 20:5 and ! = 0:657: Here I set the parameters at the maximum-likelihood estimates since Mankiw and Reis themselves use these estimates when reporting the impulse response function of in ‡ation to monetary policy. In any case, using the Bayesian estimates rather than the maximum-likelihood estimates does not change results signi…cantly. 21 Note, however, that = 34:1 is implausibly high. is typically calibrated between 6 and 10.
higher value of :
Finally, I assume that the shocks processes are the same in all models. The productivity shocks follow an AR(1) process. The serial correlation parameter is assumed to be z = 0:95; and the standard deviation of the shock is set to be " zt = 0:007. These are standard assumptions in the real business cycle literature. For the tax shocks, following Walsh (2005) , the serial correlation parameter is calibrated as = 0:80 and the standard deviation of the shock is set to be " t = 0:024: Walsh obtains these values by estimating an AR(1) process for detrended log …scal variables, using the dataset on tax revenues complied by Blanchard and Perotti (2002) .
Results
This section aims to answer the following question: what are the consequences of implementing a policy rule that is optimal from the perspective of the IC and SI models if the true model is either the GG or the GT E? To answer this question, I …rst assume that the true is the GG and then consider the case in which the central bank uses the IC model when formulating its monetary policy. This case is of particular interest, since the IC model is many central banks' favorite model and, as we have seen earlier, in ‡ation dynamics in the two models are almost exactly the same. More speci…cally, the central bank simulates the IC model to …nd the optimal reaction coe¢ cients in the policy rule. I then compute the welfare loss as a result of such a policy in the true economy (i.e. using the GG model). I then repeat the same experiment for the case in which the central bank uses the SI model when formulating its policy instead of the IC model. I then perform the same experiments for the case in which the central bank uses the Calvo GT E model when formulating its policy instead of the GG model. Before carrying out this experiment, it is essential to establish that the optimised three parameter rule performs well in each model. I will also discuss how policy conclusions are a¤ected by whether in ‡ation inertia arises in a manner consistent with the micro-data. Welfare levels (W ) are expressed in terms of the equivalent percentage decline in terms of steady state consumption, which can be obtained by dividing W by U c C. Welfare levels under optimal policy corresponds to those discussed in Section 2.4.
Optimal Policy and Micro-evidence on Prices
In this section, I evaluate the performance of the optimised rule for each model. Table 3 also shows, the models di¤er in their recommendations for the optimal policy. Reported are the optimal -coe¢ cients that minimise the welfare loss in each model. A key di¤erence arises when it comes to how aggressive the central bank should be in its response to in‡ation. According to the SI model, the central bank should respond aggressively to in ‡ation. The coe¢ cient of in ‡ation in the policy rule is as high as 11. This …nding is in line with the …ndings reported in Reis (2008) . Reis (2008) studies optimal monetary policy by using the sticky information model and …nds that the optimal value of is larger than the typical estimates of this parameter. For example, as noted earlier, Rudebusch estimates that = 1:24: Therefore, Reis (2008) concludes that "..interest rates should respond more aggressively to in ‡ation than they have". However, if one employs the IC model for the monetary policy analysis, the conclusion would be exactly the opposite; interest rates should respond less aggressively to in ‡ation than they have. According to the IC model, the coe¢ cient is much less than that suggested by the SI model and is around 0:67. The Calvo-GT E suggests a value of = 1:1: The value of suggested by the GG is very similar to the value of suggested by the Calvo-GT E : = 1:4 .
In tracing the source of the reasons for di¤erences in policy recommendations, let me begin by considering the mechanism at work in the Calvo-GT E model. To understand the mechanism at work in the GT E, …rst note that price stickiness dampens the e¤ect of a shock on prices. In other words, when prices are sticky, …rms cannot change them as much as they would when prices are ‡exible. This sluggish adjustment means that a small change in prices implies a large change in the optimal prices of …rms. This is because when …rms reset their prices, they take into account the fact that they will have to charge the same price throughout the length of the contract. Since there is a trade-o¤ between price stability and output gap stability, the large movements in …rm prices require large movements in the output gap to control price stability. Therefore, a policy that reacts strongly to in ‡ation is costly. As a consequences, the coe¢ cient of in ‡ation in the policy rule is not large, with a value of around 1. Now consider the IC model. The …nding that the central bank should not react strongly to in ‡ation in this model is in line with the …ndings reported in Woodford (2003, p. 482-83) . This is due to the fact that the assumption of indexation alters the loss function of the central bank in an important way: the central bank aims to stabilise ‡uctuations in ( t a t 1 ) ; rather than Next consider the GG. The policy that this model suggests is very similar to the policy suggested by the Calvo-GT E. It is important to note that the GG suggests the need to react to in ‡ation slightly more strongly than is suggested by the Calvo GT E. The GG suggests a value of = 1:4; whereas the Calvo GT E suggests that should be = 1:1. The reason for this di¤erence is that price stability is harder to control in the GG, due to the presence of backward-looking-rule-of-thumb price-setters. As discussed earlier, the loss functions in this model clearly shows that price dispersion in the GG increases as the proportion of the rule of thumb …rms increases. Thus, the higher the proportion of rule of thumb …rms in this model, the harder it becomes to control in ‡ation. Indeed, as Figure 2 shows, the higher the fraction of the rule-of-thumb …rms, the more aggressive the central bank should be in its response to in ‡ation.
Finally, we can look at the SI. The question here is why this model favours a policy that strongly reacts to in ‡ation. The main reason is that the policy trade-o¤ that the central bank faces is less important than the policy trade-o¤s in the other models. That is, in this model reacting to in ‡ation strongly requires smaller output gap movements to control in ‡ation. The reason for this is an aspect of the model that is inconsistent with the micro-data: a di¤erent price can be chosen within the span of the contract. In this model, the length of the contract does not a¤ect the price setting behaviour: regardless of the contract length, for any period t; the price set by a given …rm will be its best guess at what the optimal ‡exible price will be in that period. In sharp contrast, in the GT E; the contract length does a¤ect price-setting behaviour, as is the case in the Calvo model. As discussed in section 2.3, in the GT E;the reset price in sector i is the average optimal ‡exible price over the length of the contract. The nominal price is constant over the contract length. In the Calvo model, if ! is large, for example, then the …rm gives more weight to the near future, since a large ! means that the price it sets now is less likely to survive, and vice versa. In the SI, prices also adjust sluggishly due to the fact that some …rms adjust their prices while using out of date information. However, it appears that in a model in which price stickiness arises due to information rigidity, it is less costly to react to in ‡ation strongly than in a model in which price stickiness arises due to staggered contracts. This can be demonstrated by choosing a value of ! for the SI model that brings the model's predictions closer to those in the Calvo-GT E. All of the other parameters in the SI are calibrated as in the Calvo-GT E. A value of ! that brings the SI's predictions closer to those in the Calvo-GT E is ! = 0:1; which is lower than the value of ! in the Calvo-GT E: As Table 5 shows, when ! = 0:1; the policy recommendations of the SI model are very similar to those of the Calvo-GT E. The relative losses in the two models are almost exactly the same and the optimal policy parameters are also very similar. It should also be noted that the value of ! = 0:1 is much lower than what the model would require to explain the in ‡ation persistence we observe in the data. This analysis thus allows me to conclude that the policy trade-o¤ in the SI model is less severe and, therefore, it is less costly to react to in ‡ation strongly.
The analysis above indicates that the features of the IC and SI models that are inconsistent with the micro-data on prices a¤ect the degree of trade-o¤ between in ‡ation and output gap stabilization: the policy trade-o¤ is severe in the IC model, whereas in the SI model it is not. To put it di¤erently, the SI model underestimates the cost of output gap ‡uctuations, unless a su¢ ciently low value of ! is assumed, whereas the Calvo-GT E overestimates the cost. The importance of this point for optimal policy design can also be demonstrated by considering a policy that reacts to in ‡ation and the lagged interest rate only (i.e., an extreme in ‡ation-targeting policy). As discussed above, given the policy trade-o¤, such a policy would typically require larger output gap movements and, therefore, would lead to larger welfare losses. This turns out not to be the case according to the SI. As the table shows, under the benchmark calibration, this policy does not visibly a¤ect the welfare loss unless a substantially lower value of ! is assumed. Perhaps not surprisingly, the IC yields a very di¤erent conclusion: ignoring ‡uctuations in the output gap is very costly. The loss is 7%: The Calvo-GT E suggests that such a policy leads to larger welfare losses. However, the cost is not as high as what the IC model suggests. The loss is only 2%. Again, the GG agrees with the Calvo-GT E's assessment. The more general conclusion from this experiment is that the IC and SI models can potentially provide a misleading assessment of outcomes under alternative policy rules. IC SI Calvo GT E GG Welfare losses 1.07 1.00 1.02 1.04 Table 4 : Welfare loss under an extreme in ‡ation-targeting policy relative to that under an optimal Taylor rule Two conclusions emerge from this discussion. First, an optimised Taylor rule performs reasonably well across all models. Second, policy conclusions that arise from the SI and IC are signi…cantly a¤ected by the aspects of these models that are inconsistent with the micro-data on prices.
Welfare Costs of Ignoring Micro-data on Prices
I have shown that the optimised Taylor rule performs reasonably well across all models under consideration here and I have demonstrated that the aspects of the IC and SI that are inconsistent with the micro-evidence on prices a¤ect policy conclusions. I now turn to my main question: how much welfare loss would be incurred if a central bank employed a model for monetary policy analysis that was inconsistent with the micro-evidence on prices?
True Model
Policy generating models
GG Calvo GT E IC; a = 0:76 SI
(1) GG 1:08 1:51 1:15
(2) Calvo GT E 1:07 1:34 1:29 Table 5 : Performance of policy rules that are optimal in the IC and SI when the true model is either the Calvo-GTE or the GG I …rst assume that the true economy is represented by the GG model. I then consider the case in which the central bank formulates its policy by employing the IC model. Row 1 column 3 of Table 5 reports the welfare loss in the GG under the rule that is optimal from the perspective of the IC model. As is evident from Table 5 , employing a rule that is optimal from the perspective of the IC model can lead to a poor outcome in the GG. The relative loss in this case is as high as 50%: Turning to the SI, row 1 column 4 Table 6 shows the results of the same exercise as in Row 1 column 3 of Table 5 but assumes that the policy generating model is the SI. When the SI is assumed, the relative loss is around 20%: Thus, the GG suggests that it is very costly to ignore the micro-evidence on prices. The GG model further suggests that it would be less costly to implement a policy that arises from the SI model, compared to a policy that arises from the IC model.
Turning to the case in which the true economy is the Calvo-GT E, row 2 of Table 5 repeats the same exercises as in row 1 of Table 5 but assumes that the true situation is represented by the Calvo-GT E. The results reported there indicate that the conclusion in the previous experiment carries over to a setting in which the true situation is represented by the Calvo-GTE: it is costly to ignore the micro-evidence on prices. According to the Calvo-GT E; the loss is around 30%:
In light of the discussion in the previous section, the source of the large welfare losses in the Calvo-GT E and the GG is easy to identify. The SI recommends a larger value for . Such a policy would stabilise the ‡uctuations in in ‡ation in the Calvo-GT E and the GG at the cost of signi…cantly greater output gap variability. In contrast, the IC recommends a small value for : The resulting policy would not be su¢ cient to stabilise in ‡ation in the Calvo-GT E and the GG.
It appears that the scale of the welfare costs of ignoring the micro-data is model dependent. To understand the di¤erences in magnitudes, …rst recall from the pervious section that price stability is harder to control in the GG than in the Calvo-GT E and, therefore, the central bank using the GG needs to react more aggressively to in ‡ation to achieve the same level of stabilization in ‡ation as when using the Calvo-GT E: Thus, even if is the same in both models, in ‡ation in the GG would not change as much as it does in the Calvo-GT E 23 . As a consequence, under the SI policy the change in the output gap in the GG would not be as large as in the Calvo-GT E. Therefore, the relative loss in the GG due to implementing the SI-policy is smaller than the relative loss in the Calvo-GT E. It also interesting to note that if a policy fails to stabilize ‡uctuations in in ‡ation su¢ ciently, such a policy would be more costly in the GG than in the Calvo-GT E. The reason is also easy to understand. The rule-of-thumb price price-setters in the GG model update their prices according to the past in ‡ation rate. Thus, the higher initial in ‡ation rate under the IC policy in the GG model further reinforces in ‡ationary pressures in this model and this lead to higher welfare losses.
I have thus far expressed welfare losses in terms of the ratio between the welfare loss in the true model under a policy that is suggested by a model that ignores the mciro-data and the welfare loss under the optimal policy in the true model. It would also be instructive to express welfare losses in terms of consumption (i.e. the di¤erence between the welfare loss in the true 23 To con…rm this suggestion, I calculate the value of in the SI policy that achieves the same level of in ‡ation stabilization in the GG, as in the Calvo-GT E. All the other conditions are the same as before. The value of that achieves this is = 20: When = 20; the proportional change in the welfare cost of price dispersion and in the output gap variability in the GG is very similar to those of in the Calvo-GTE. Thus, the relative losses in each model are very similar. model under a policy that is suggested by a model that ignores the mcirodata and the welfare loss under optimal policy in the true model). Consider, for example, the case in which the true model is represented by the GG one and the policy formulation model is the IC model. In this case, the welfare loss is 0:01% of consumption. If I consider the case in which the standard deviations of shocks to productivity are doubled, then the loss goes up 0:02% of consumption. The Calvo-GT E suggests a similar level of welfare loss.
The general conclusion from these experiments is that it is costly to employ models to monetary policy analysis that are inconsistent with the microdata on prices.
Relation to the Literature
This section reviews the literature on this topic. Levin, López-Salido, Nelson and Yun (2008) have recently also emphasised the importance of microevidence on optimal monetary design. They suggest that microeconomic datasets are one promising tool to discriminate between models when models are very similar (or are observationally equivalent) at the aggregate level but di¤er in their policy recommendations. More speci…cally, for example, in one of the cases these authors study, which is relevant to the cases I have considered, they assume that …rms set their prices according to the Calvo process and then consider two types of real rigidity which lower …rms' inclination to increase prices in the face of an increase in nominal aggregate demand . One speci…cation is …rm-speci…c inputs, as in Woodford (2003) , and the other is a kinked demand structure, as in Kimball (1995) . They then calibrate the two speci…cations in a way that the two speci…cations are identical in their implications for loglinear dynamics. Indeed, even though the two models are exactly the same at the aggregate level, the authors show that the speci…cations di¤er in their loss functions and, therefore, in their policy recommendations. However, the discussion in Levin et al. suggest that there is not enough micro evidence to reject any of the two speci…cations. In fact, it may well be the case that both speci…cations are empirically relevant. My analysis di¤ers substantially from theirs. I compare models of pricing that are consistent with the micro evidence on prices to those that are not. However, the conclusions reported in this paper can be seen as complementary to those of Levin et al. (2008) ., further strengthening their conclusions. This paper is also related to that of Levin and Williams (2003) . Levin and Williams consider optimal monetary policy design in di¤erent models. Some of the models these authors consider, however, do not have explicit microfoundatiions (e.g. a Fuhrer and Moore model with habit persistence in consumption, as in Fuhrer (2000) and an empirical VAR model). They also employ an ad-hoc loss function for the central bank. However, recent work by Walsh (2005) shows that policy conclusions based on the standard exogenous objectives can be misleading. This paper considers models that have microfoundations and derives a loss function for each model by taking a second-order approximation of the representative households utility function. Thus, this paper extends the Levin and Williams (2003) analysis to the case in which the objectives of monetary policy are endogenous.
Summary and Conclusions
The failure of the Calvo model to account for key macro-evidence has led to two main responses in the literature: the introduction of indexation to the Calvo model (IC) and the adoption of Fischer contracts and a Calvo distribution of contract lengths (Sticky Information) (SI). Both of these theories are inconsistent with the micro-data on prices, as all prices change at each period.
The purpose of this paper has been to investigate the consequences of employing models that are inconsistent with the micro-data for optimal monetary policy design. To do so, I have used two models. The …rst model is the model suggested by Gali and Gertler (1999) and the second model is the Generalized Taylor Economy (GT E). The GG model assumes that a fraction of …rms set their prices according to a rule-of-thumb. The rest of the …rms set their prices according to the Calvo process. The GT E is a generalisation of the simple Taylor model and explicitly allows for sectoral heterogeneity with the ranges of contract lengths suggested by the data. I consider a special case of the GT E, namely, the Calvo-GT E; in which the distribution of contract lengths is generated by the Calvo model, as in the IC and SI models. Both models are consistent with the micro-data and can potentially explain the persistence of in ‡ation.
The …ndings reported in this paper suggest that policy conclusions are signi…cantly a¤ected by the aspects of the IC and SI models that are incon-sistent with the micro-data on prices. More speci…cally, the aspects of the models that are inconsistent with these micro-data a¤ect the degree of the policy trade-o¤ between price stability and output gap stability. Therefore, a failure to recognise the importance of micro-data can lead to misleading analysis regarding the policy trade-o¤s that policymakers face and may result in the design of policy rules that may not be appropriate for implementation. Indeed, policies that are optimal from the perspective of these models can lead to welfare losses when using models that are consistent with micro-data. The models that are consistent with micro-data lead to very similar policy recommendations.
I conclude, therefore, that the models that are inconsistent with the micro data should not be used for monetary policy analysis. The more general lesson is that it is a mistake to put all emphasis to the macro-data and to overlook the micro-data, as has been the case in the past. A failure to recognise the importance of micro-evidence on optimal monetary design can mislead policymakers about the trade-o¤s they face and, therefore, can lead to the design of policies that are not be appropriate for implementation.
Appendix:
A The Model
A.1 Households
The representative household h has a utility function given by
where C ht , H ht are household h 0 s consumption and hours worked respectively, t is an index for time, 0 < 1 is the discount factor, and h 2 [0; 1] is the household speci…c index.
The household's budget constraint is given by The …rst order conditions derived from the consumer's problem are as follows:
Q(s t+1 j s t ) = E t u ct+1 P t u ct P t+1 = 1 R t (25)
Equation (24) is the Euler equation. Equation (25) gives the gross nominal interest rate. Equation (26) shows that the optimal wage. The index h is dropped in equations (24) and (26), which re ‡ects our assumption of complete contingent claims markets for consumption and implies that consumption is identical across all households in every period (C ht = C t ):
A.2 Firms
A typical …rm in the economy produces a di¤erentiated good which requires labour as the only input, with a CRS technology represented by
f 2 [0; 1] is …rm speci…c index. Di¤erentiated goods Y f t are combined to produce a …nal consumption good Y t : The production function here is CES and corresponding unit cost function P t
The demand for the output of …rm f is given by
The …rm chooses fP f t; Y f t ; L f t g to maximize pro…ts subject to (27, 30), yields the following solutions for price, output and employment at the …rm level given fY t ; W f t ; P t g :
(1 + ll ) E f (ŷ f t )ẑ t E f (ŷ f t ) l t ) + t:i:p
De…ning E f (ŷ f t ) = Rŷ f t df and V ar f (ŷ f t ) = E f ŷ 2 f t E f (ŷ f t ) 2 ;taking a second order approximation of (29) and using the resulting expression to substitute for E f (ŷ f t ) ;I obtain
V ar f (ŷ f t )
(1 + ll ) ŷ tẑt ŷ t l t 1 A + t:i:p (42) Summing (38) with (42), using the steady-state relations U C (C)C = V L (1 L)L, (1 cc ) y t = (1 + ll ) l t and the de…nition of the natural level of output, I obtain U t (C)+V (1 L t ) = U C (C)C 2 ( cc + ll ) ŷ t ŷ N t 2 + ( 1 + ll )V ar f (ŷ f t ) +t:i:p Dropping all the hats from the output variables since the point of approximation is the same ( y t ); using (30) to replace V ar f (y f t ), I obtain equation (17) in the text.
